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THE PEYOTE CASE: A RETURN To REYNOLDS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's April 17, 1990 decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,' denying the constitutional right
of Native American church members to use peyote as a sacrament, has
been decried as "deplorable," '2 "radical," '3 an exercise in "pure legal
adventurism," "a sweeping repudiation of nearly a century of humane
and enlightened legal precedent," and "an affront ... to our society's
'4
hard-won pluralism."
The Court unequivocally rejected the slowly eroding "compelling
interest" requirement for governmental interference with religious practices laid down by the Warren Court in the early 1960's, calling it a
"constitutional anomaly" 5 that "contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. ' 6 In its place, the Court offered "leaving accommodation [of religious rights] to the political process," brushing
aside the admittedly probable disadvantage to minority religions as an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government. ' 7 In Smith, the
Court regressed to pre-Warren Court interpretations of the free exercise clause.8 In so doing, it gutted the free exercise clause, leaving no
protection for the religious practices of minority religions.
This Comment briefly sketches the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause as a background against which to
focus the significance of the Court's regression from established precedent. It also examines the profound, perplexing implications of the
Court's conclusions and the means by which Justice Scalia, author of the
majority opinion, erects a smoke screen to hide those implications.
II.

PRIOR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

The first Supreme Court case interpreting the free exercise clause,
Reynolds v. United States,9 upheld a Mormon's conviction under a federal
law prohibiting polygamy. The Court held that while the free exercise
clause prevented government interference with religious belief and opinion, it did not prevent government interference with religious practices.10
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
2. "Peyote Decision Threatens Religious Liberty of All Americans Says Jewish Organization," PR Newswire, April 20, 1990.
3. The National Law Journal, June 18, 1990, at 13 (quoting Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 9th Cir.).
4. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, Part B (Metro), at 6, col. 1 (Home Edition).
5. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
6. It at 1604.
7. let at 1606.
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
10. lE at 166.
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This "belief/action" distinction has been widely criticized and discredited as divesting the free exercise clause of any function and meaning
because the constitutional guarantee of free expression includes protection of religious belief and opinion." It survived for several decades,
12
however, proving an impossible obstacle to free exercise claims.
Next followed an era in which the only victorious free exercise
claims were those in which the free speech aspects of the claims were
considered.' 3 Two cases, both involving the right of Jehovah's Witnesses' children to abstain from saluting the flag at school, bring this
4
principle into relief. In the first case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,1
the Court upheld the state's expulsion ofJehovah's Witnesses' children
from public school for refusing to salute the flag, never mentioning the
free speech issues involved. The Court held that the free exercise guarantee did not relieve a citizen from his duty to obey a generally applicable law' 5 and that courts were not competent to provide an exemption
because of religious beliefs where the legislature had not seen fit to do
so. As long as the government's ends were legitimate (in this case, promoting national unity), the means would be left to legislative
discretion.16
In contrast, three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,1 7 the Court considered the same claims in the context of free
speech as well as free exercise, rejected the reasoning of Gobitis and held
that requiring children to salute the flag in order to receive the benefits
of public education infringed first amendment liberties.' 8 The Court
stated that "individual freedom of mind"' 9 was to be preferred over "officially disciplined uniformity" 20 and that freedoms of speech and worship could not be infringed on the "slender grounds" 2' 1 that the
legislature may have had a "rational basis" 22 for adopting certain restrictions. In Barnette, the Court presaged its later strict scrutiny of free
exercise claims, saying that freedoms of speech, press, assembly and religion could be restricted only to prevent "grave and immediate danger to
23
interests which the State may lawfully protect."
11. See, e.g., Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1989); Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternativesfor
the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309 (1981); Tribe, Church and State in the Constitution, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 37-38 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
12. See, Lupu, supra note 11, at 938; Pepper, supra note 11, at 325 & n.70; Braiterman
& Kelley, When Is Governmental Intervention Legitimate?, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 11, at 175.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See, Pepper, supra note 11, at 326-27.
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 597-98.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
id at 637.
Id.
Id at 639.
Id
Id.
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In Braunfeld v. Brown 24 and more forcefully in Sherbert v. Verner, 25 the
Warren Court implicitly rejected the Reynolds belief/action distinction
and articulated a stricter standard for evaluating free exercise claims resulting from state action burdening religious conduct:2 6 if a state action
directly burdens the free exercise of religion, the state must show a compelling interest that justifies the burden and also must demonstrate that
alternative non-burdensome means of accomplishing its purposes are
not available. 2 7 In Sherbert, the Court held that a Seventh-Day Adventist
could not be denied unemployment benefits for failure to accept work
without cause because she refused jobs that required her to work on
Saturday. It found that the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of
the unemployment compensation fund was not compelling enough to
justify the substantial infringement of the Seventh-Day Adventist's first
28
amendment right to practice her religion.
Although the results of applying the Sherbert standard have not always been entirely predictable or consistent,2 9 the Court has used it,
with minor variations,3 0 for thirty years. It has been used to uphold religious claims as well as to support the state's compelling interests. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 1 the Court decided that the free exercise clause mandated an exemption for the Amish from Wisconsin's requirement that
children attend school through the age of 16. The Court rephrased the
Sherbert standard in even stronger language: "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."'3 2 The Court specifically rejected
the Reynolds belief/action distinction, stating that "belief and action can33
not be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."
A restriction of the application of the Sherbert standard followed the
expansion of its application represented by Yoder. Recent decisions have
narrowed the Sherbert standard by heightening the severity of the burden
required and by focusing on whether the challenged government action
"directly burdens" the free exercise of religion.3 4 For example, in 1972
the Yoder Court unquestioningly accepted the assertion that requiring
Amish children to attend school through the age of 16 (two years more
than the Amish wanted) would cause the demise of the entire Old Order
24. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

26. See Lupu, supra note 11, at 939.
27. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-10. This standard is referred to throughout as the "Sherbert standard" or "Sherbert test."
28. Id. at 407.
29. See id. at 417 (Stewart, J., concurring) (maintaining that the Sherbert decision was
inconsistent with the Braunfeld decision, which denied Saturday Sabbatarians' free exercise
claims against a state law declaring Sunday a day of rest).
30. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 529-30 (1986)(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summary of variations of the Sherbert standard).
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id at 220.
34. See generally Lupu, supra note 11, at 942-46 (detailing the Court's recent use of the
"burden" threshold).
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Amish church community. Thus, the Court found a severe enough burden to satisfy the threshold of the Sherbert test.3 5 In contrast, in 1988 the
Court decided against religious adherents in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association.3 6 That case involved a free exercise challenge to the United States Forest Service's decision to build a road
across sacred Indian lands in a federally owned forest. Although the
Indians had proved that the road would physically obliterate practices
necessary to all of their ceremonies and rituals and would cause the demise of their religion, 3 7 the Court held that no legally cognizable burden on the Indians' religious practices existed because the road-building
did not indirectly or directly coerce, penalize, or prohibit religious practices. 38 The government was thus not required to justify its decision to
build the six-mile segment of road that two lower courts had found all
39
but useless.
The narrowed application of the Sherbert standard exemplified by
40
Lyng and other recent decisions has caused apprehension and dismay.
Until Smith, however, the Court continued to protect religious beliefs
practices from all but "compelling" governand at least some religious
41
ment interference.

III.

THE SMITH CASE

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were counselors employed by the
Douglas County Oregon Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment, a non-profit private drug abuse rehabilitation clinic.
As a matter of policy, their employer required all counselors not to use
alcohol or non-prescription drugs. Smith and Black were fired after they
admitted they had ingested small amounts of peyote as a sacrament
while participating in a ceremony of the Native American Church, of
which both were members. Possession of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug,
42
is a felony under Oregon law.
Smith and Black applied for unemployment compensation benefits
and were determined ineligible for benefits under Oregon law because
they had been fired as a result of work-related misconduct. 43 They chal35. 406 U.S. at 212, 218.
36. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
37. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 447-53.
39. Id. at 462-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 316
(1986); Lupu, supra note 11, at 945-46; Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedomfor Indigenous
Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363 (1986).
41. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), af'g per curiam, Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d
1121 (8th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
42. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.605(2), 475.992(4)(a) (1987).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987) ("An individual shall be disqualified from
the receipt of benefits.., if... the individual... [h]as been discharged for misconduct
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lenged the rulings, 4 4 asserting that because their peyote use was religiously motivated, the denial of benefits burdened the free exercise of
their religion. 45 After several administrative hearings and appeals, the
46
denial of benefits was upheld in both cases.
In Black's case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, applying Sherbert,
held that the denial of benefits was a substantial burden and that the
state's only interest, preventing depletion of the unemployment compensation fund, was not compelling.4 7 The court specifically rejected
the state's contention that its compelling interest was to prohibit illegal
drug use, stating that this interest was irrelevant because the challenged
state action was the denial of benefits, not criminal prosecution for drug
use. 4 8 Smith's case was reversed and remanded for further considera49
tion in light of the decision in Black.
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
analysis, reiterating that the illegality of possessing peyote was not determinative or even relevant in these cases because commission of a felony unrelated to work was not grounds for disqualification from
unemployment benefits, and law enforcement was not the purpose of
the unemployment compensation program.50
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 1 because it
disagreed with the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning that the criminality of peyote possession was irrelevant to the constitutional claims. 52
The Court indicated that whether Smith's and Black's peyote use would
be afforded free exercise protection turned on whether religiously motivated peyote use was illegal as a matter of Oregon law. If the state had
criminalized religious peyote use without offending the free exercise
clause, the state would be allowed to impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits. 53 The Court remanded the
case for a determination of whether religiously motivated peyote use

54
was illegal under Oregon law.

On remand, the Oregon court decided that the first amendment, as
connected with work .... "); OR. ADMIN. R. 471-30-038(3) (1986) ("[Misconduct is a
wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of
an employee [,] . . . wilful disregard of an employer's interest, or recurring negligence
which demonstrates wrongful intent .... ").
44. Smith's and Black's cases advanced separately through administrative proceedings
and through the Oregon courts, but were consolidated when certiorari was first granted in
the United States Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v.
Smith, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
45. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 71, 763 P.2d 146, 147 (1988).
46. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 n.5

(1988).
47. Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274 (1985).
48. Id. at 1280.

49. Smith v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985).

50. Black v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221, 225, 721 P.2d 451, 453 (1986); Smith v.
Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 218-19, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (1986).
51. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
52. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 661 (1988).
53. Id. at 670.
54. Id. at 674.
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interpreted by Congress, mandated an exemption from the state's criminal laws for religiously motivated peyote use. 55 A second appeal to the
Supreme Court resulted in the decision that is the subject of this
Comment.
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, holding
that the free exercise clause did not require an exemption from Oregon's criminal laws for sacramental peyote use. 56 Joining in the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Kennedy, and Stevens.
The Court stated that while government may not control religious
belief, it may enforce generally applicable, neutral laws that incidentally
prohibit religious conduct. 57 The Court announced that it would not apply the Sherbert standard because it would produce a "private right to
ignore generally applicable laws," 58 and instead advocated reliance on
the political process to protect religious freedoms. 59
C. Justice O'Connor's ConcurringOpinion
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice O'Connor
in Parts I and II of her concurrence. Justice O'Connor rejected the belief/action distinction, stating that the first amendment did not make
such a distinction. 60 She further contended that the first amendment
did not distinguish between "neutral" laws and laws that discriminate
against religion, and that the Sherbert standard should be applied to all
laws that significantly burden religion. 6 1 She maintained that criminal
laws, even more than civil laws, burdened the free exercise of religion
and should be strictly scrutinized. 6 2 She argued that the first amendment's purpose was to protect religious rights by withdrawing them
63
from the political process.
In Part III of the opinion, she concluded that religious peyote use
need not be exempted from criminal laws, but reached this conclusion
by applying the Sherbert standard. She found that Oregon's criminal pro55. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 307 Or. 68, 74-76, 763
P.2d 146, 149-50 (1988). In 1978, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), making it "the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian ....including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites." See also H.R. Rep. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2
(1978) ("[I]t is established Federal law that peyote is constitutionally protected when used
by a bona fide religion as a sacrament.").
56. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
57. Id.at 1599.
58. Id.at 1604.
59. Id.at 1606.
60. Id.at 1608 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
61. Id. at 1610.
62. Id.at 1611.
63. Id.at 1613.
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hibition placed an undeniably severe burden on respondents' exercise of
their religion, 6 4 but that the state's interest in prohibiting the peyote
possession for the health and safety of its citizens was compelling. 65
Since the state could not accommodate the religious use of peyote without compromising its health and safety goals, the first amendment did
66
not require the state to grant an exemption.
D. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun contended that Justice O'Connor's characterization of the state's interest
was overbroad, and that the state's precise interest in disallowing an exemption from its laws for sacramental peyote use was not sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the free exercise claim. 6 7 He argued that the
state's insistence on the importance of uniform enforcement of its criminal law was contradicted by the fact that it had not attempted to prosecute respondents for their peyote use and had not claimed to have
enforced the law against other religious peyote users. 6 8 He also thought
it significant that the state had offered no evidence that the ritual use of
peyote had ever harmed anyone. 69 To the contrary, peyotism had been
instrumental in helping many of its adherents overcome alcoholism, /a
much greater problem among Indians than peyote abuse. Thus, religious peyote use was compatible with the state's health and safety
70
interests.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORrrY OPINION

The Court returns to Reynolds by stating that although government
may not regulate religious belief, it may regulate religiously motivated
conduct, as long as the regulation is generally applicable, neutral and
does not represent an attempt to intentionally burden the exercise of
religion. 7 1 The Court imposes no requirement of necessity or even reasonableness as long as the burden on religious practices, no matter how
severe, is only an incidental effect of the regulation.
As Tribe says, the distinction between beliefs and actions is shallow,
because the government never attempts to interfere with beliefs, only
conduct. In almost every case the issue is whether the government
should be allowed to prohibit or interfere with one's conduct "because of
one's beliefs, or despite one's beliefs." 7 2 The Court prevents only government interference with conduct "because of one's beliefs," 7 3 but
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1614.
Id.
l at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id at 1617.
Id. at 1618.
Id. at 1619-20.
IdL at 1599-600.
Tribe, supra note 11, at 38. See also Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 12, at 175, 190.
Tribe, supra note 11, at 38.
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provides no protection at all from government interference "despite
one's beliefs." 74 As Justice O'Connor indicates, few legislatures would
blatantly enact a law whose stated purpose was to prohibit a religious
practice as such. 7 5 Yet this is the only kind of law that would merit first
amendment scrutiny under the Court's new formulation.
Another problem with the application of this new standard is that it
does not address the difficulty of distinguishing genuinely neutral laws
from laws that only appear to be neutral, but whose underlying purpose
is to interfere with unpopular religious practices. Just three years prior
to writing the Smith opinion, Justice Scalia was aware of the impossibility
of discerning the subjective motivation of legislators:
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite ....

[F]or example, a particular

legislator... may have thought the bill would provide jobs for
his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction
of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have
been a close friend of the bill's sponsor .... or he may have
hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fund
raising appearance for him ....or he may have been mad at his
wife who opposed the bill .... or he may have accidentally

voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may have had...
a combination of some of the above and many other motivais
tions. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator
76
probably to look for something that does not exist.

If discerning the real purpose or purposes behind a law is impossible,
courts will rely on the state's ad hocjustifications of statutes. Rarely will
a state's attorneys be incapable of formulating a believable and legitimate purpose for the statute in question other than blatant religious discrimination. 77 History shows that "legitimate" purposes have been
used to justify a great deal of discrimination. 78 Intolerance of minority
religions can easily be couched in terms of public health, safety, and
79
morality.
After granting government all but unlimited power to regulate religiously motivated conduct, the Court attempts to show that this power
has always resided in the government. The Court inaccurately asserts
that it has "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate." 8 0 It supports this assertion by citing dis74. Id
75. 110 S. Ct. at 1608.
76. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (rejecting the suggestion that the Court should investigate the actual purpose motivating the
legislature in an equal protection context).
78. See, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1940) (Stone, J.,

dissenting).
79. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). For a list
of books on religious persecution perpetrated by the state, see Lupu, supra note 11, at 961

n.105.
80. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1600.
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credited cases and by misusing and mischaracterizing precedent. For
example, the Court cites Gobitis for the principle that "mere possession
of religious convictions" 8 1 does not relieve the individual from obedience to a generally applicable, neutral law, and cites Reynolds in support
of the widely discredited8 2 belief/action distinction.8 3 The Court fails
to mention that it is reviving previously rejected interpretations of the
first amendment.
The Court lists other precedents it contends stand for its new principle in which religious exemptions to generally applicable laws were
denied. Again, the Court fails to mention that the exemptions were denied only after the Court had applied the Sherbert test and had found that
the state's interest was compelling and could be served in no less burdensome way. In no case did the Court reach its result merely by finding that the laws were generally applicable, valid, and neutral.8 4 By
emphasizing only the results of the cases and not the principles they
stand for, the Court dishonestly attempts to appear to be applying wellestablished precedent rather than discarding it.
The Court's assertion that it has "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"8 5 is plainly wrong.
In Yoder the Court held exactly that. Relying exclusively on the free exercise clause, the Yoder Court specifically rejected the Smith Court's new
rule, stating that even a facially neutral regulation may be constitution86
ally offensive if it burdens the free exercise of religion.
Rather than acknowledging that its new rule is contrary to established precedent, the Court dismisses Yoder and other cases that have
held generally applicable and neutral laws subject to free exercise scrutiny. The Court states that these cases were "hybrids" involving not just
free exercise claims but also free speech claims or parental rights
claims;8 7 however, in none of the cases cited does the Court attribute its
81. It
82. See id at 1607-08 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing the fallacy of the Reynolds
belief/action distinction); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[B~elief and
action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.").
83. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
84. See id. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Specifically, in U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 259-60 (1982), the Amish were not exempted from the mandatory payment of Social
Security taxes because of the impossibility of accommodating numerous religious exemptions while maintaining a functional social security system. In Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S.
437, 462 (1971), the Court refused an exemption to the draft for persons who opposed a
particular war on religious grounds because the burden on free exercise was not severe
and was "strictly justified by substantial governmental interests ....
In Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961), the Court determined thatJewish merchants would
not be exempted from Sunday closing laws because these laws imposed only an indirect
burden on religious observance and because the state's purpose for having one common
day of rest would be defeated by allowing exemptions. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944), the Court decided that the state's compelling interest in protecting children justified denying Jehovah's Witnesses an exemption from child labor laws.
85. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
86. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
87. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
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results to the presence of other rights. Although, as the Court states, in
these cases the Court "specifically adverted to the non-free exercise
principle involved," 8 8 they did so only in passing. The Court appears to
be asserting that if a decision could have been reached on other
grounds, it has no value as precedent, or that the free exercise clause, if
it has any meaning at all, is entirely subsumed within free speech and
parental rights. The first assertion would render almost any decision
non-precedential, while the second assertion is a judicial amendment of
the Constitution.
The Court then discusses its reasoning for finding that the Sherbert
test applies only to the unemployment compensation field. It explains
that even though it appears to have applied the Sherbert test in other
settings, the Court has not really done so. In other settings the Court
has always found the test to be satisfied.8 9 Again, this assertion is inaccurate. For example, the test was applied in McDaniel v. Paty,90 in which
Tennessee's disqualification of ministers of religion from membership in
the Legislature was found to violate a minister's free exercise rights.
The law burdened a minister's right to exercise his religion by conditioning it on the surrender of his right to seek office, and Tennessee
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in excluding the ministers

from the Legislature. 9 1 In Larson v. Valente,9 2 the Court struck down an
act requiring only those charitable organizations that received less than
half of their total contributions from members to report to the state.
Although the state asserted a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from abusive solicitation practices, the state had failed to show that
the act was "closely fitted to further the interest."9 3 In Wooley v. Maynard,9 4 using the Sherbert test and finding no compelling government interest, the Court invalidated a law requiring the display of the New
Hampshire state motto "Live Free or Die," a slogan offensive to respondents' religious beliefs, on license plates of passenger vehicles.
In Smith, the Court states that even if the Sherbert standard still ap-

plies in some situations, it certainly does not apply to the challenge of a
criminal law. 95 But as Justice O'Connor emphasizes, the Sherbert stan-

dard should apply with even greater force where the free exercise of
religion is criminally prohibited, because this burden is the most substantial of all the burdens a state can place on free exercise. 96 For example, in denying the Indians' free exercise challenge to the government's
plan to build a road across sacred lands in Lyng, the Court relied on the
concept that the key word in the free exercise clause was "prohibit," and
88. Id. at 1601 n.1.
89. Idl at 1602.
90. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
91. Id. at 626.
92. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
93. Id- at 248.
94. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
95. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
96. See id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (A criminal law is more burdensome
than a civil statute.).
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since the government had not prohibited the practice of religion, the gov97
In Bowen v. Roy, 98
ernment had not infringed free exercise rights.
ChiefJustice Burger concluded that the free exercise clause was not violated by the denial of welfare benefits to an Indian father who refused to
provide a social security number for his young daughter because he
feared impairing her spirit. Government regulation merely requiring a
choice between obtaining a government benefit and exercising religious
beliefs was not a legally cognizable burden, while the threat of criminal
sanctions to refrain from religious conduct would have been. 99 Even
though ChiefJustice Burger advocated applying rational basis review to
claims for government benefits, he recognized that criminal prohibition
should be more strictly scrutinized: "[T]he nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the
burden."1 0 0
The Court explains that the Sherbert test is a "constitutional anomaly" because judges are incompetent to determine the centrality of the
proscribed conduct to the individual's beliefs, and judges have no business contradicting a believer's assertion that certain conduct is central to
his religion. 10 1
This reasoning overlooks the fact that a large part of a trial court's
job consists of judging credibility. Courts are capable of judging the
credibility of a claimant's assertions as to the centrality of the religious
practice in question without having to rule on the actual centrality of the
religious practice. 10 2 As Professor Lupu says, any standard of review
stricter than rational basis will involve the court in some value judgments, and when the courts can be trusted more than other governmental branches to make a just decision, allowing the courts to make the
value judgments is justified. 10 3 As Justice Jackson said in Barnette, "[W]e
act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of
1 0° 4
our commissions."
Justice Scalia suggests that it is "horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws
the significance of religious practice." 10 5 As Justice Brennan concludes
97. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 451

(1988).
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in his dissenting opinion in Lyng, "the Court's apparent solicitude for
the integrity of religious belief and its desire to forestall the possibility
that courts might second-guess the claims of religious adherents leads to
far greater inequities than those the Court postulates." 10 6 The greater
inequity is that judges can no longer balance these competing interests,
but must now uphold general, neutral laws, no matter how trifling, and
no matter how significant the religious practices they prohibit.
Without some evaluation of the significance of the religious conduct
in question, two alternatives remain, as the Court suggests.10 7 Either
the free exercise clause has no meaning, or religious persons are totally
insulated from all state
control or intervention, l1 8 in which case we are
"courting anarchy." 10 9 Obviously, having limited itself to these two
choices, the Court is forced to choose the lesser of two evils, and thus
avoid starting courts down the "slippery slope," of allowing exemptions
for religious conduct ranging from child neglect to cruelty to
animals. 1 0
"Slippery slope" arguments are inapposite when it is proven that
other decision makers are capable of understanding and applying the
doctrinal lines drawn.'
All of the claims for exemption for religious
conduct cited in Scalia's "parade of horribles" were denied by courts
applying the Sherbert standard. Although courts consistently reached the
result the Court presumably would have reached, the Court still feels
the need to simplify courts'jobs so that they no longer have to deal with
the inconvenience of deciding each case.
Finally, the Court proposes to leave these sensitive decisions to the
political process. The scope of the state's police power includes health,
safety, and morals.' 12 Morality is so closely intertwined with religious
beliefs that the two are almost inseparable. Thus the state, through the
political process, can legislate according to majority religious beliefs and
preferences.
Smith is a good example of that principle. In most mainstream religions, it is immoral to use hallucinogenic drugs such as peyote, but
moral to use alcohol in moderation. According to the beliefs of Native
American Church members, it is immoral to use alcohol, but moral to
use peyote in moderation.' 1 3 Experts agree that sacramental peyote use
does not injure the user, and that peyotists are no more likely to become
addicted to drugs than non-peyote-users." 4 That claim cannot be made
about the use of alcohol. Health risks are easily quantifiable in each
case. Sacramental peyote use is obviously not as harmful as alcohol con106.
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107.
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sumption, even in moderation. Why, then, is alcohol consumption not
forbidden? Because the majority no longer thinks alcohol consumption
is immoral.
The government will never intentionally or even inadvertently regulate in such a way as to infringe the rights of politically powerful religious majorities. It will, however, inadvertently or even intentionally
dictate the majority's moral and religious choices to the detriment of the
15
rights of religious minorities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The profound question before the Court was whether the government would be allowed to impose the majority's opinions and attitudes
on the individual, not just for a compelling reason but for no reason at
all. The Court answered that question "yes," and entrusted the protection of the constitutional rights of unpopular religions to the very institutions that threaten them. Laws that protect a particular set of moral
views while outlawing others for no compelling reason, no matter how
facially "neutral" they appear to be, are discriminatory. As a consequence of the Smith decision, such laws no longer warrant the strict scrutiny formerly deemed essential to the protection of religious rights.
Theresa Cook

115. Pepper, supra note 40, at 314.

